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ARGUMENT 
REPLY POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS WERE ADMISSIONS OF 
NEGLIGENCE. THEY WERE ALSO HIGHLY PROBATIVE OF 
KEY ELEMENTS IN PLAINTIFF'S CASE. THEY WERE NOT 
UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL. IN EXCLUDING THE 
ADMISSIONS, THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND 
PREJUDICED PLAINTIFF'S CASE. 
The court plainly and manifestly erred by precluding plaintiff from adducing evidence 
at trial of admissions made by defendant Zeluff. After defendant removed plaintiffs toe 
joint and the implant procedure failed, Dr. Zeluff s assistant/wife said to plaintiff, "I told him 
he shouldn't have done this." Dr. Zeluff then stated to plaintiff, "I jumped the gun. I don't 
think we should have done this surgery. You need to go see a different doctor." He also 
said, "I've missed something." These statements were both admissions of negligence and 
essential proof on key elements of plaintiff s case. In excluding the admissions, the court 
abused its discretion and prejudiced plaintiffs case. 
It should first be noted that extra-judicial admissions of a party-opponent hold a 
unique place in the law of evidence. They are, by definition, non-hearsay and of such a 
relevant nature that their admissibility would appear secure. Rule 801(d), Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Indeed, in none of the cases cited by defendant did a court preclude or exclude 
admissions of a party opponent. See cases discussed below. Rather, at issue in those cases 
was whether the admissions which were admitted into evidence were sufficient to uphold a 
verdict or to avoid a summary judgment or directed verdict. No case cited by defendant, and 
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no case that plaintiff could find, has ever excluded admissions of a party opponent on the 
grounds that the admissions were unfairly prejudicial.1 The fact that defendant, as well as 
plaintiff, has been unable to find a single case from any jurisdiction where a trial court 
excluded admissions of a party-opponent on Rule 403 grounds, is telling. 
Admissions of Negligence 
Defendant Zeluffs statements were admissible as admissions of negligence of apart-
opponent. In Robertson v. LaCroix, 534 P.2d 17 (Ok. Civ. App. 1975), plaintiff Robertson 
suffered continual urine leakage through a vesico-vaginal fistula (i.e., an opening between 
the bladder and vagina) after a hysterectomy performed by defendant Dr. LaCroix. At trial, 
plaintiff testified that in a follow-up visit, Dr. LaCroix stated "he had racked his brain trying 
to figure out what he had done differently or he had done wrong, but the only thing he 
knew was that he just made a mistake and got over too far." Id. at <[f6. 
Plaintiff actually called Dr. LaCroix as her expert at trial. Id. at f 7. Dr. LaCroix 
testified the fistula could have been caused by an incision or a puncture of the bladder by an 
instrument, or by a suture through the wall of the bladder, which would have been a breach 
of standard care. He also testified that the injury could have been, and, in his opinion, was 
due to an embarrassment of the circulation in the area which in turn would cause the dying 
of the tissue and a hole to form at some later date. Id. He thus ruled out the possibility that 
!Thus, defendant's statement is false that "courts outside Utah have addressed this issue and 
have determined that such evidence is not admissible because it's (sic) prejudicial effect outweighs 
any minimal probative value it may have." See defendant's brief p. 39. 
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the fistula was caused by his negligence. Id. at f 8. However, plaintiff also presented 
circumstantial evidence on the timing of the injury, tending to show a negligent cause. At 
the close of plaintiff s evidence, the trial court entered a directed verdict. Id. at f 12. 
The issue on appeal was whether the plaintiffs evidence established a prima facie 
case of Dr. LaCroix's negligence. Id. The court stated as follows: 
Plaintiff urges that any doubt as to whether her evidence 
establishes a prima facie case of negligence is resolved by the 
extra-judicial admission of the defendant. We agree. It is well 
settled in Oklahoma and elsewhere that the extrajudicial 
admission of a party opponent has the same legal competency 
as direct expert testimony to establish the requisite elements of 
a prima facie case of negligence in a medical malpractice 
action. Bungardt v. Younger, 112 OkL 165, 239 P. 469; 
Greenwood v. Harris, Okl., 362 P.2d 85. See 1 Washburn LJ. 
614; and cases cited in 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 62. 
The only question presented here is whether the statement 
attributed to the defendant is of sufficient quality to constitute 
an extrajudicial admission of negligence.... 
We hold that the defendant's statement that he "just made a 
mistake and got over too far" is more than a mere statement of 
mistaken judgment; it constituted an admission of negligence 
during the performance of the surgery. Whether this admission 
by itself would be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of expert 
medical testimony to establish a prima facie case we are not 
required to decide. We simply hold, in line with a number of 
recent cases, that this extrajudicial admission is additional 
highly probative evidence tending to establish that the 
proximate cause of plaintiffs injury was the negligence of the 
defendant in performing the surgery. SeeJacobsen v. Harting, 
Ky., 397 S.W.2d 775 ("Ishould have run that test"); Sheffield 
v. Runner, 163 Cal. App.2d 48,328 P.2d 828 ("Should have put 
her in the hospital"); Wickoffv. James, 159 Cal. App.2d 664, 
324 P.2d 661 (MBoy, I sure made a mess of things"); Walter v. 
England, 133 Cal. App. 676, 24 P.2d 930 ("made a mistake"). 
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Id. at ^[24-26. (Emphasis added). The court then ordered a new trial. Id. at f28. See also, 
Benson v. Tkach, 30 P.3d 402, ff 15,17 (Okla. App. 2001) (holding that while the conclusory 
opinions of plaintiffs expert could not avoid summary judgment, defendant doctor's 
statement that "Medicare had his hands tied," constituted an extra-judicial admission of 
negligence that he did not provide what he considered proper treatment because of financial 
considerations). 
In the case at bar, defendant's statements are like the statements quoted above as 
admissions of negligence. Defendant Zeluff stated that he had missed something, that he 
"jumped the gun," and that he should not have done the surgery. This was substantial and 
significant evidence tending to show that defendant Zeluff breached the standard of care. 
The jury should have been allowed to consider this. There was nothing unfairly prejudicial 
about admission of the statements. Defendant Zeluff would not have somehow been 
estopped from denying or explaining away the statements. He would have had full 
opportunity to explain the statements or to deny them under oath. 
The Utah Supreme Court cited the Robertson case in Jennings v. Stoker, 652 P.2d 912 
(Utah 1982), in support of the doctrine that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case may 
meet his burden of proof by calling the defendant physician to testify: 
Absent a situation "where the propriety of the treatment received 
is within the common knowledge and experience of the layman," 
the plaintiff in a medical malpractice case must prove the 
standard of care by expert medical testimony. Nixdorfv. Hicken, 
Utah, 612 P.2d 348 (1980). This standard may be supplied by 
the testimony of the defendant himself The use of the 
defendant as an adverse witness subject to cross-examination 
-4-
to establish part of the plaintiffs case is a trial technique 
which has been used and approved by many courts. . . . "It is 
a well-established rule that a plaintiff in a malpractice action 
is entitled to call the physician-defendant as an adverse 
witness, usually pursuant to the state's adverse party statute, 
and, as a general proposition, to question the defendant as to 
matters relevant to the issue in dispute." 
Id. at 913. (Citations omitted. Emphasis added). 
Nevertheless, defendant argues that his admissions are not necessarily evidence of 
breach of the standard of care, and cites Sutton v. Calhoun, 593 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1979), 
Senesac v. Associates, 449 A.2d 900 (Vt. 1982), Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 
104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (Cal. 1972), and Phinney v. Vinson, 605 A.2d 849 (Vt. 1992) 
In Sutton, the court upheld the trial court's decision not to instruct the jury that a 
defendant doctor's statement, he "made a mistake" during gall-bladder surgery, was an 
admission of negligence. Id. at 128. The doctor denied making the statement but said, in any 
event, that plaintiff had unique anatomy and, so, a mistake would not equate to negligence. 
Id. The court held that the jury should be allowed to decide what was meant by the doctor's 
statement and should not be forced to take only one view of the statement. Id. The material 
point of Sutton, for purposes of the appeal at bar, is that the jury did hear the statements 
made by the defendant. They were relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. They were not 
excluded by the trial courtl The jury was allowed to decide if the statements constituted 
admissions of negligence or not. 
Similarly, in Senesac, the court did not exclude evidence of defendant doctor's 
admission that he "made a mistake." Senesac at 903. However, because the plaintiff offered 
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no expert testimony to support that statement as a breach of the standard of care, the court 
entered a directed verdict. Id. Again, the material point for purposes of the case at bar is that 
the admission was not excluded, but was admitted into evidence. 
In Cobbs, the jury found in favor of plaintiff in spite of the fact that he retained no 
expert witness to testify at trial. Id. at 231. Plaintiff relied on the testimony of the defendant 
doctor and his experts, including defendant's statement that he blamed himself for plaintiff 
being back in the hospital. Id. The court noted, "Defendant is a medical expert; if he in fact 
made inculpatory declarations of negligence, such admissions could be deemed the expert 
testimony necessary to sustain the verdict." Id. However, the court found that the statement 
was not necessarily an admission of negligence, and, by itself was insufficient to support a 
finding of negligence: 
Since a medical doctor is not an insurer of result, such an 
equivocal admission does not constitute a concession that he 
lacked or failed to use the reasonable degree of learning and 
skill ordinarily possessed by other members of the profession in 
good standing in the community, or that he failed to exercise due 
care. ...see Lashley v. Koerber (1945) 26 Cal. 2d 83 [156 P.2d 
441](admission together with other evidence, sufficient to 
submit question of negligence to jury). 
Id. The material point of Cobbs for purposes of the appeal at bar is, again, that the defendant 
doctor's admission, even though arguably a statement of sympathy, was still properly 
admitted into evidence for the jury's consideration. The case was reversed not because the 
statement should have been excluded under Rule 403, but because the statement was an 
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equivocal admission of negligence and, without supporting expert testimony, could not of 
itself establish a breach of standard care. 
Finally, in Phinney, summary judgment was sustained where the plaintiff relied only 
on defendant doctor's apology for failing to perform an adequate resection. Id. at 849. 
Significantly, the court stated, "While defendant's statement may have been admissible, it 
was insufficient by itself to meet plaintiffs burden . . . ." Id. The court distinguished the 
apology from cases involving clear admissions of negligence. Id. See, e.g., Wootenv. Curry, 
362 S.W.2d 820, 822 (1961)(defendant stated that plaintiffs injuries would have been 
avoided "if he had checked on her as he should").2 
While the nature of the statements made by defendant Zeluff in the case at bar place 
them in the category of admissions of negligence rather than an apology, even if the court left 
it to the jury to decide which they were, the material point is that all case law, including every 
single case cited by defendant Zeluff, stands for the proposition that such party-opponent 
admissions are obviously admissible. The court erred in precluding this important evidence 
from the jury. The verdict should be reversed and a new trial ordered. 
2Defendant repeatedly argues that he denies making the statements, as though that is 
grounds for the trial court to exclude them from the jury's consideration. To the contrary, 
Rule 403 U.R.E. may not be used to allow the trial judge to substitute his assessment of the 
credibility of testimony for that of the jury. State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1987). 
Defendant also accuses plaintiff of trying to use Dr. Zeluff s admissions to inflame the jury. 
Even were that true, the Utah Supreme Court has noted that the general rule is that if 
evidence is relevant and competent, the mere fact that it may be inflammatory does not 
render the evidence inadmissible. State v. Danker, 599 P. 2d 518 (Utah 1979). 
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Probative of Key Elements of Plaintiff s Case 
Not only were the excluded statements an admission of negligence or, at least, 
evidence of breach of standard care, they were highly probative of key elements in Plaintiff s 
case. One of the issues in the case was whether defendant Dr. Zeluff negligently 
recommended and performed an unnecessary and aggressive procedure in removing 
plaintiffs toe joint and replacing it with an implant. Before performing the procedure, 
defendant failed to consider that plaintiffs toe pain could be from his rheumatoid arthritis, 
rather than a diseased joint. Defendant's statements that he "jumped the gun", that he 
"missed something", that he should not have done the surgery, and that plaintiff needed to 
see another doctor, were all highly probative of Dr. Zeluff s failure to consider another cause 
for plaintiffs pain and his failure to refer him to a rheumatologist before performing an 
aggressive and debilitating implant surgery. 
Also, at trial, plaintiff established that defendant Zeluff made no notation anywhere 
of the joint he removed being diseased, and that rather than have pathologic examination of 
the joint, as is customary, he simply discarded the joint. Plaintiff also established that the x-
rays were indicative of a healthy joint. The implication of all this evidence was that the joint 
was healthy. However, Dr. Zeluff, who, because of discarding the joint, had exclusive direct 
view of the joint, testified it was diseased. His admissions noted above would have provided 
powerful contradictory evidence and established much more fully, that, indeed, he removed 
and discarded a healthy joint. 
-8-
REPLY POINT II 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN DECLINING TO EXCUSE PARTIAL 
JURORS FOR CAUSE. 
Defendant argues that since six of the eight jurors sitting on the jury were 
unchallenged for cause, that Plaintiff was not prejudiced by the court allowing two biased 
jurors to sit. This is not correct. 
Obviously, even a single biased juror can influence other jurors during deliberations 
and thus bring about an unfair result. The test for prejudice is not whether six unchallenged 
jurors sat, but whether "as a result of the loss of his peremptory challenge [plaintiff] was not 
able to remove another subsequently summoned juror who ultimately sat on the jury, and who 
was partial or incompetent." Harding v. Bell, 57 P.3d 1093, 2002 UT 108 \\1. Such was 
the case in the matter at bar, as plaintiff had to use all three of his peremptory challenges on 
potential jurors who were challenged, but not excused for cause. This left biased jurors 
Wilkey and Moss on the jury. 
In his response brief, defendant Zeluff focuses on his and the court's ability to obtain 
assurances from Wilkey and Moss that they could be fair and impartial, in spite of their initial 
statements manifesting strong prejudice. That, however, is insufficient under the Utah 
Supreme Court's recent pronouncements in West v. Holley, 2004 UT 97, 103 P. 3d 708. 
In West, the court noted that litigants are entitled to a fair and impartial jury and that 
"[ajlthough we accord trial courts considerable discretion in ruling on motions to dismiss 
jurors for cause, we have encouraged them to err on the side of dismissing questionable 
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jurors. Id. at f 12. The court stated, "Voir dire responses revealing evidence of bias or 
partiality give rise to a presumption that a potential juror is biased, and the juror must be 
dismissed unless that presumption is rebutted. Id. at \\A. The court then stated, 
Under our case law, however, a presumption of bias cannot be 
rebutted solely by a juror's bare assurance of her own 
impartiality because a challenged juror cannot reasonably be 
expected to judge her own fitness to serve. The trial court must 
focus on the juror's expressions of attitudes, opinions, and 
feelings about subjects related to the case, rather than on the 
juror's assessment of her own objectivity. "A statement made 
by a juror that she intends to be fair and impartial loses much 
of its meaning in light of other testimony and facts which 
suggest a bias. 
West, 2004 UT 97, f 15. (Citations omitted, emphasis added). 
In the case at bar, the strong prejudices manifested by jurors Wilkey and Moss were 
not rebutted as required by the supreme court. Instead, after bringing these jurors to 
chambers and subjecting them to leading questions by defendant, defendant and the court 
were able to obtain statements from the jurors that they could be fair. The focus, instead, 
should have been open-ended questions delving further into the strong prejudices expressed 
by these jurors. 
Before he was led to state he could be fair, Robert Wilkey said, (1) he was a medical 
helicopter pilot affiliated with the U of U medical center, who was "tainted" by all the 
medical malpractice reform discussions, (2) he believed a verdict for plaintiff would make 
his insurance rates go up, (3) he would be unable to put aside these feelings to render a fair 
and impartial verdict, (4) he had negative feelings about lawyers who represent patients, (5) 
-10-
if he were one of the parties, he would not feel comfortable having someone like him sit on 
the jury, and (6) he had a bias in favor of those in the military. See R. 808:6-18,32. Rather 
than strike Mr. Wilkey for cause at that point, as the court seemed inclined to do, the court 
granted defendant's request to bring Mr. Wilkey into chambers to make him "straighten up 
and fly right." R. 808:32. Through leading questions in an intimidating setting, that is 
precisely what defendant did. 
David Moss similarly expressed strong prejudices before he was brought into 
chambers and led to state he could probably be impartial. He felt medical malpractice 
lawsuits have caused the cost of medical care and/or insurance to increase. R. 808:12. He 
further indicated that he would be unable to follow the Court's instruction in awarding a fair 
and impartial verdict given his bias. R. 808:13-16. He also revealed that he would be 
uncomfortable having himself as a juror if he were one of the parties. R. 808:18. During in-
chambers discussion with Mr. Moss, he admitted his bias: "I know nothing about this case 
but I have a concern about people that are kind of professional litigants now looking and 
trying to just find ways to make money." R. 808:44 (emphasis added). He then stated that 
this "is a bias that I do carry I think that is potentially, I don't want to say damaging, but it's 
there." R. 808:44 
After some rehabilitation by the Court, which the judge jokingly referred to as 
"beat[ing] up," Mr. Moss responded that he would try to be fair. R. 808: 44-45. This 
rehabilitation, however, proved to be elusive as Mr. Moss held firm to his bias against 
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awarding damages and was adamant that he would be unable to award a "full amount" of 
damage. R. 808:45-47 
In failing to excuse Mr. Wilkey and Mr. Moss, the court exceeded its discretion and 
seated two prejudiced jurors. This is reversible error and the court should order a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The court should vacate the judgment of the trial court and order a new trial since the 
trial court committed prejudicial error in precluding evidence of defendant's statements 
which were admissions of negligence and highly probative of key elements in the case. A 
new trial is also warranted because the court impaneled a jury with two witnesses, who 
because of strong prejudices, should have been excused for cause. 
DATED this 22nd day of May, 2006. 
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RON J. KRAMER 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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